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REASSESSING THE SCOPE OF CONDUCT
PROHIBITED BY SECTION 10(b) AND THE
ELEMENTS OF RULE 10b-5: REFLECTIONS ON
SECURITIES FRAUD AND SECONDARY ACTORS
Andrew S. Gold'
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decision in Central Bank, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank, N.A.' rejected aiding and abetting liability for private
actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,2 it produced
a major upheaval in securities law.3 The Central Bank Court upended
decades of lower court decisions that recognized aiding and abetting
claims,4 and engendered substantial scholarly criticism.
+ Mr. Gold is an associate with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, in its
Wilmington, Delaware office and assistant professor-designate at DePaul University
College of Law. J.D., Duke University; B.A., Dartmouth College. The author would like
to thank Michael Barlow, John Beckerman and Elizabeth Rhea for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the
author, and do not represent the views of Skadden, Arps or its clients.
1. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (rejecting aiding and
abetting liability under § 10(b)).
3. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually
Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C.
L. REV. 691, 694-95 (1997) (noting that Central Bank "had the potential to effect a sea of
change in ... securities fraud litigation").
4. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing examples of
circuit court decisions from eleven federal circuits). Justice Stevens noted that hundreds
of federal court and administrative proceedings recognized aiding and abetting liability
prior to the Central Bank decision. Id. at 192.
5. See, e.g., Alan R. Bromberg, Aiding and Abetting: Sudden Death and Possible
Resurrection, 27 SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 133-34, 139-40 (1994); Donald C.
Langevoort, Words From on High About Rule lOb-5, Chiarella's History, Central Bank's
Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 869 (1995); Prentice, supra note 3, at 694-96; James D.
Redwood, Toward a More Enlightened Securities Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court?
Don't Bank on It Anytime Soon, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 3, 6-7 (1995). This is by no means to
suggest that the Central Bank decision was universally decried, however. See, e.g., Joseph
A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget that It is an Inkblot We are Expounding: Section
10(b) as Rorschach Test, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 41, 44 (1995). Cf. Robert S. De Leon, The
Fault Lines Between Primary Liability and Aiding and Abetting Claims Under Rule lOb-5,
22 J. CORP. L. 723 (1997). Professor Fischel argued, well before Central Bank was
decided, that its result was required by the Court's earlier jurisprudence. See Daniel R.
Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L.
REV. 80, 82 (1981).
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Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 19956 (Reform Act), which significantly reworked the
pleading requirements for Section 10(b) actions,' and included an
extension of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
enforcement authority to cover aiding and abetting cases.8  Several
legislators also sought to permit aiding and abetting claims in private
causes of action.9 The Reform Act, however, did not do so.' When
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in late 2002," the distinction
between enforcement and private actions was left intact.'
2
In the lower courts, however, the actual impact of Central Bank has
been inconsistent.'3 The Central Bank Court stated that secondary
actors-for example, a securities issuer's accountant, law firm, or bank-
may be primarily liable if all of the elements of securities fraud are met.
4
The Court did not decide when secondary actors meet those elements,'"
and ten years after Central Bank, the scope of liability for secondary
actors remains unsettled.
High profile cases such as the Enron securities litigation have included
substantial claims of wrongdoing by accounting firms, lawyers, and
underwriters for allegedly engaging in fraudulent acts in conjunction with
a securities issuer.'6 Following Central Bank, the question is whether
such secondary actors qualify for primary liability based on their
participation in an issuer's fraud. In misrepresentation cases (on which
this article will focus), lower courts have split into two schools of thought.
Courts seeking to determine liability generally apply either a "bright
6. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
7. See id. at 109 Stat. 737-49.
8. See id. at 109 Stat. 757.
9. For example, Senator Bryan proposed an amendment designed to permit a
private right of action against aiders and abettors. See 141 CONG. REC. S9182 (daily ed.
June 27, 1995). For further discussion of legislative efforts to overrule Central Bank in the
private litigation context, see Broady R. Hodder, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank and Its Aftermath: Securities Professionals' Ever-Changing Liabilities, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 343, 357-58 (1997).
10. See Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 757.
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763,107th Cong. (2002).
12. See generally id. Section 703 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to
study the conduct of lawyers and accountants in connection with aiding and abetting
securities fraud. § 703(a).
13. See De Leon supra note 5, at 730-31.
14. See Central Bank, N.A. v. Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (citing
Fischel, supra note 5, at 107-08).
15. See De Leon, supra note 5, at 726-29.
16. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564
(2002).
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line" test, which requires the secondary actor to actually make a
fraudulent statement relied on by investors, or a "substantial
participation" test, which only requires substantial participation in the
creation of the issuer's statement.'
7
Two recent post-Central Bank developments merit particular
attention. The SEC, in amicus briefs, has supported a form of the
"participation" test, whereby a secondary actor is liable for securities
fraud when its participation is such that it can be considered a "co-
author" of the issuer's fraudulent statements, even if they are not
attributed to the secondary actor itself. '  As a result, courts may
conclude that the SEC's position merits judicial deference if the statute is
ambiguous.' " For example, the Enron court apparently deferred to the
SEC's interpretation.2'
In addition, in SEC v. Zandford,2' the Supreme Court embraced the
entirety of Rule 10b-5,22 including parts (a) and (c), which permit
"scheme" and "course of business" liability. 3 A recent proposal suggests
that Zandford permits a broad reading of primary liability for secondary
actors whenever they can be said to participate in a "fraudulent
scheme, 24 thus recasting issues of secondary participation in terms of an
overarching primary liability. "Scheme" liability would not require a
misstatement by a secondary actor to trigger liability.25
The SEC's theory, although an elegant reading of Central Bank and
Section 10(b), cannot be squared with statutory text as the Supreme
17. See De Leon, supra note 5, at 730-31.
18. See generally Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Klein v. Boyd, 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,136 (3d Cir. 1998), rehearing en banc
granted, judgment vacated (Mar. 9, 1998) (Nos. 97-1143; 97-1261), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/klein.txt.
19. Cf. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588-89.
20. Id. at 588 ("Because § 10(b) expressly delegated rule-making authority to the
agency, which it exercised inter alia in promulgating Rule 10b-5, this Court accords
considerable weight to the SEC's construction of the statute since the Court finds that
construction is not arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute."); id. at 589
(citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001)); id. at 590-91 ("This
Court finds that the SEC's approach to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is well
reasoned and reasonable, balanced in its concern for protection for victimized investors as
well as for meritlessly harassed defendants . .
21. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
23. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819.
24. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the State Attorneys General Relating
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 10, In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549
(2002) (No. H-01-3624).
25. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820.
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Court has interpreted it.26 "Co-authors" do not "make" misleading
statements unless they communicate the misrepresentation, the
statement is attributed to them at the time, or the actual maker of the
statement serves as their agent.27 Similarly, the Zandford case cannot be
used to circumvent Central Bank in misrepresentation cases without
effectively amending Section 10(b). 8  If participation in drafting
misrepresentations created primary liability for fraudulent "schemes" or
"courses of business," Central Bank would be largely emptied of its
meaning.29 The SEC's theory would unduly expand part (b) of Rule 10b-
5, and the proposed application of Zandford would unduly expand parts
(a) and (c).
Much of the commentary regarding primary liability post-Central Bank
has explicitly or implicitly taken issue with the Court's textualism. Yet, if
one wishes to determine what Central Bank and its predecessor decisions
mean for secondary actors, it is necessary to faithfully apply their
rationale. The approach of this Article will follow the textualist
philosophy applied by the Court in Central Bank in determining the
scope of primary liability for secondary actors under Section 10(b).
This article concludes that the "bright line" test is the only
interpretation of primary liability for secondary actors that is consistent
with the reasoning of Central Bank, as it is the only test under which
investors can be said to rely on statements made by the secondary actor,
such that the secondary actor can be said to "use" or "employ" deceptive
devices. Although certain forms of participation by secondary actors
may meet this test for primary liability-participation as such, they
cannot support a primary claim without conflicting with the text of
Section 10(b).
Following textualist principles, moreover, Chevron deference3" should
not apply to the SEC's interpretation of the scope of conduct prohibited
by Section 10(b) in the private cause of action context, even if Section
10(b) were ambiguous as to the type of conduct prohibited. Pursuant to
the Supreme Court's explication of Chevron deference in United States v.
Mead Corp.," such deference is based on presumed legislative intent to
delegate interpretive authority to the relevant agency. As there is no
evidence Congress contemplated a private cause of action, let alone
delegation to the SEC to develop the bounds of that action, there is
inadequate basis for Chevron deference. Because a private right of
26. See infra text accompanying notes 113-25.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 113-25.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 126-51.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 126-51.
30. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
31. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
[Vol. 53:667
Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors
action was not originally part of the statute, but was instead created by
courts, courts should construe the scope of prohibited conduct narrowly
in the private litigation context.
Part II of this Article analyzes Central Bank and the lower court
decisions that have applied its holding. Part III addresses the SEC's co-
authorship test for primary liability. Part IV addresses the impact of
Zandford. Part V argues for a narrow interpretation of the Section 10(b)
private right of action even if the statutory text is considered ambiguous.
II. CENTRAL BANK AND LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF ITS
HOLDING
A. The Central Bank Decision
Although private actions are frequently brought pursuant to Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, this provision does not actually
prohibit conduct on its own. Section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to set
forth rules making it unlawful:
LF]or any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange...
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.32
Essentially, Section 10(b) is a delegation to the SEC. Pursuant to this
provision, in 1942 the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5, which made it unlawful
for any person:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.33
While the Supreme Court has recognized an implied private right of
action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 despite the absence of express
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
2004]
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textual support,34 the Court also recognized the lack of evidence that such
liability was intended by Congress." Neither the text nor legislative
history supported an implied private right of action. 6  Indeed, there is
little to suggest that the SEC intended a private right of action when it
drafted Rule lOb-5.33
The existence (or non-existence) of congressional intent to create a
private action is significant. The more recent holdings on implied rights
of action require a determination that Congress intended a private right
of action in order for courts to recognize one."' Courts may not infer
such rights based on common law concepts or public policy. 9 No such
intent is evident for Section 10(b). 4" Thus, if the Court were deciding on
a blank slate whether Congress had implied a private right of action
under Section 10(b) under modern precedent, it is probable that no
implied right of action would be found.4' By the time the Supreme Court
recognized a private right of action, decades after it was first implied by
lower courts, the existence of the action was so prevalent it was a fait
accompli.
41
34. See Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (describing the
private right of action as "beyond peradventure"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 196 (1976) (describing the action as "well established"); Superintendent of Ins. of
N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13, n. 9 (1971). The private right of
action was first recognized in Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946).
35. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196 (noting that Section 10(b) "does not by its terms
create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or
the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy"). See also
Central Bank, N.A. v. Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (noting that
"determining the elements of the 10b-5 private liability scheme has posed difficulty
because Congress did not create a private § 10(b) cause of action and had no occasion to
provide guidance about the elements of a private liability scheme").
36. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196, 201. See also Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority,
107 HARv. L. REV. 961, 978-79 (1994).
37. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196. See also Grundfest, supra note 36, at 980-81.
38. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577-78 (1979); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
39. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578 ("The ultimate question is one of congressional
intent, not one of whether this Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme that
Congress enacted into law."); Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, 444 U.S. at 15-16 ("The
question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is
basically a matter of statutory construction."). For a useful discussion of the evolution in
the Court's thinking on these questions, see Fischel, supra note 5, at 91-92.
40. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 36, at 978-79.
41. See Fischel, supra note 5, at 92 ("Since there is no evidence to suggest that
Congress intended to create a private remedy under section 10(b), Touche Ross and
Transamerica indicate that none should have been implied by the courts.").
42. See supra note 34, and cases cited therein.
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It is against this backdrop that Central Bank was decided. The Court
reversed a Tenth Circuit ruling that found liability expressly on the basis
of aiding and abetting.4' The Central Bank Court relied on the absence
of any textual reference to "aiding and abetting" in Section 10(b) to
preclude such liability under Rule 10b-5, rejecting an implied right of
action beyond the primary liability already established by the Court's
precedent."
In approaching the question of whether aiding and abetting liability
was available, the Central Bank Court divided its precedent into two
types of cases: first, cases that determine the scope of conduct prohibited
by Section 10(b); and second, cases that interpret the elements of the
Rule 10b-5 private liability scheme.
The Central Bank Court explained that in those instances where it has
determined the elements of Rule 10b-5 for private actions, it has had to
infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had a 10b-5
action been included expressly in the Securities Exchange Act.4  This
inference is a natural product of the source of the private action-the
43. See Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see
also First Interstate Bank, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992).
44. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176-77.
45. See id. at 172. Professor Seligman has taken issue with this distinction, and notes
that virtually no lower court had drawn the distinction. See Joel Seligman, The
Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429, 1431-32 (1994). Seligman also contends
that the distinction is based on legal fiction, as "Congress was no more precise in defining
the scope of the conduct prohibited by section 10(b) than it was in delineating the
elements of a section 10(b) claim." Id. at 1432. Seligman cites the Supreme Court
decisions in Chiarella v. United States and Dirks v. SEC, cases in which the Court turned to
analysis from SEC precedent and common law understandings to fill in a text which was
silent respecting the details of prohibited conduct. See id. However, such examples are not
necessarily inconsistent with a holding that courts should not go beyond the text to expand
the scope of prohibited conduct beyond what is textually prohibited. Cf Fischel, supra
note 5, at 93-94 n.81, explaining:
Reliance on the common law in Chiarella... was necessary to flesh out the scope
of prohibited conduct under the 'manipulative or deceptive' practice language of
§ 10(b). It lends no support to the analysis in secondary liability cases where
conduct has been prohibited under various common law doctrines without regard
to whether such conduct was prohibited by the statute.
Id. Having concluded that the text of Section 10(b) only covered fraud, the Chiarella
Court refused to expand Section 10(b) to cover other conduct. If Justice Kennedy's
citation to Central Bank in Chiarella arguably oversimplified the degree to which the
Court has historically relied on text alone in interpreting the scope of conduct prohibited
by Section 10(b), the basic premise that where the scope of conduct is concerned one may
not exceed textual limits is still plausible, even if extratextual sources are necessary to fill
in that text. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 174 ("We stated that 'the 1934 Act cannot be
read more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit'....")
(citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234). Filling in textual imprecision and expanding the text's
scope are distinct endeavors.
46. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173.
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private right of action was never expressly included in the Securities
Exchange Act but rather found by implication.4 ' The text on this subject,
not surprisingly, has gaps.
In contrast, where the issue is the scope of conduct prohibited by
Section 10(b), the Central Bank Court explained that "the text of the
statute controls., 4 Thus, while a private plaintiff may sue under Section
10(b), it "may not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not
prohibited by the text of § 10(b). ' ,49 The aiding and abetting claim fell
under this scope of conduct line of precedent, where congressional
silence is dispositive."' Essentially, the issue for the Court was whether to
imply an additional private right of action that Congress apparently had
not intended, this time for assisting fraud.
Once the Court settled on a textualist approach, its reasoning led
ineluctably to a denial of aiding and abetting liability. The Court noted
that the language of Section 10(b) "does not in terms mention aiding and
abetting. ' '52  It further noted that Congress was perfectly capable of
imposing aiding and abetting liability expressly, as it had done in other
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Technically, the language of Section 10(b) does not prohibit any conduct,
except insofar as Rule 10b-5 does so. Section 10(b) creates liability based on actions "in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (2000). Nevertheless, Section 10(b) is not without content. For example, certain
limitations on the breadth of Rule 10b-5, such as a scienter requirement for Rule 10b-5
actions, have been found in the text of Section 10(b). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73
(1977) (pointing out that Section 10(b) only extends to cases involving manipulative or
deceptive conduct). This precedent addresses the conduct "covered" by Section 10(b).
Cf Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 175. For a theory that Section 10(b) was originally intended
to give the SEC very broad power to regulate the securities markets, see generally Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 385 (1990).
50. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 172-77.
51. It is evident that cases recognizing the implied right of action and Central Bank
are in tension, although the different results can be harmonized. As Professor Fischel
remarked regarding aiding and abetting:
In fact, the case for focusing solely upon congressional intent in analyzing
secondary liability, and not upon tort law or any other common law doctrine, is
even more compelling than in the implied remedies context. Implying a private
remedy to redress violations of a statute requires recognition of a cause of action
even though none has been expressly created by Congress. The conduct of the
defendant, however, has been expressly prohibited by Congress. The question of
secondary liability, in contrast, involves expanding the scope of prohibited
conduct under a statute.
Fischel, supra note 5, at 93.
52. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 175.
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statutes. 3 Because the text did not provide for aiding and abetting
liability, none was available.54 The congressional silence meant that
secondary liability was not part of the statute. 5
In reaching its holding, the Central Bank Court concluded that its
reading of the text would not reach a bizarre result . Subsequent
legislative events reinforce this conclusion." The Reform Act, by
extending SEC enforcement actions to cover aiding and abetting liability,
effectively overturned Central Bank in the enforcement context, while
leaving intact the holding for private rights of action."' Such legislative
53. See id. at 176-77 (citing federal statutes which explicitly set forth aiding and
abetting provisions).
54. Id. at 174-77. Efforts to limit the impact of Central Bank have noted the Supreme
Court's buttressing of its textual argument with policy arguments. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch,
The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary
Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1312 (1999). However, the Central Bank holding is
not actually based on policy considerations, and the subsequent decision in United States v.
O'Hagan does not hold otherwise. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 664-65
(1997) (placing Central Bank's reference to "purchasers or sellers" in the context of policy
considerations discussed in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
The Central Bank Court explained that "[p]olicy considerations cannot override our
interpretation of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help
to show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that
Congress could not have intended it." 511 U.S. at 188. This review of policy represents a
confirmation of the Court's textual analysis, not a source of that analysis. Professor
Eisenberg has argued that the willingness in Central Bank to consider a bizarre results
exception is fundamentally inconsistent with textualism. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 28 (1995) (noting that "under the exception,
every case requires the strict-textualist judge to take account of extratextual considerations
as a basis for a prudential judgment whether the result reached is bizarre"). For an
account of how courts may effectively evade bizarre results without relying on the doctrine
as presently conceived, see John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2387, 2455-56 (2003). The bizarre results exception was not applied in Central Bank,
however, and therefore the text of Section 10(b) was decisive.
55. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177.
56. See id. at 188-90.
57. This is so at least to the extent one accepts that Congress's response to Central
Bank was not "bizarre." The significance of that response to ratification arguments
remains open to dispute. Compare Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-
86 (1983) ("In light of this well-established judicial interpretation, Congress' decision to
leave § 10(b) intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the § 10(b)
action."), with Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 185-87 (discussing theories of congressional
ratification or acquiescence, and noting "[a]s a general matter, however, we have stated
that these arguments deserve little weight in the interpretive process").
58. Another argument raised against the Central Bank decision is that its textualist
approach is inconsistent with the way statutes were interpreted when the Securities
Exchange Act was passed in 1934. See, e.g., Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 195-96 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("There is a risk of anachronistic error in applying our current approach to
implied causes of action . . . to a statute enacted when courts commonly read statutes of
this kind broadly to accord with their remedial purposes and regularly approved rights to
2004]
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inaction respecting private rights of action for aiding and abetting does
not indicate the congressional intent in 1934.59 Yet, it appears the
Congress that enacted Section 10(b) did not contemplate a private action
in the first place.6°
B. The "Bright Line" Test
In the wake of Central Bank, a number of lower courts settled on a test
for primary liability that requires the secondary actor to engage in a
misrepresentation on which a plaintiff relied, rather than merely
participate in its creation.6 ' This typically means that the statement must
be attributed to the secondary actor. 6  Known broadly as the "bright
line" test, this theory can be traced to language in Central Bank warning
that if the Court accepted aiding and abetting liability, it would permit
plaintiffs to circumvent the reliance element of the private right of
63
action.
In misrepresentation cases, the reliance requirement supplies a
necessary causal link between the alleged deceptive act and a plaintiff's
injury: it is integral to primary liability.64 Unless the secondary actor also
"makes" the material misstatement, it is not the secondary actor's actions
which have caused the plaintiff's injury from that misstatement, even if
the secondary actor indirectly enabled the injury to occur. 6' The
sue despite statutory silence."). A flaw in this argument, whatever its merits in other
contexts, is the lack of evidence that Congress anticipated a Section 10(b) private right of
action when the Securities Exchange Act was enacted, and indeed there is a similar lack of
evidence that it contemplated aiding and abetting liability. Cf id. at 183. The risk of
rejecting interpretive methodologies on which the enacting Congress relied is highly
speculative in this context.
59. Cf id. at 184-85.
60. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998); Anixter
v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 n.10 (10th Cir. 1996); In re JWP Inc. Sec.
Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Primavera Familienstiftung v. Askin, 1996
WL 494904, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1996); In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec.
Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994).
62. Cf. Ziemba v. Cascade Intern'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001)
("[I]n order for [a secondary actor] to be primarily liable under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
the alleged misstatement or omission upon which a plaintiff relied must have been publicly
attributable to the defendant at the time that the plaintiff's investment decision was
made.").
63. Central Bank, 51 U.S. at 180 ("Were we to allow the aiding and abetting action
proposed in this case, the defendant could be liable without any showing that the plaintiff
relied upon the aider and abettor's statements or actions .... Allowing plaintiffs to
circumvent the reliance requirement would disregard the careful limits on 10b-5 recovery
mandated by our earlier cases.") (citations omitted).
64. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
65. Cf Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
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deceptive words are typically someone else's words-and therefore the
source of liability is typically someone else's action.
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court concluded that a
plaintiff's reliance is a necessary element to proving a Section 10(b) claim
based on a misrepresentation.6 6 Similarly, the Central Bank Court
explained that:
Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material
misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5,
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under
Rule 10b-5 are met. 7
Courts applying the "bright line" test have focused on this reliance
requirement in mandating that the secondary actor must make a
misrepresentation rather than merely participate in its creation.6
In addition to a strict reading of the reliance requirement, courts have
looked to the nature of aiding and abetting liability, and concluded that
mere participation is, inherently, to aid and abet a primary
• • 69
misrepresentation. As the Second Circuit concluded:
[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must
actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be
held liable under Section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct
is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how substantial
that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under
Section 10(b).7 °
A definition of primary liability that collapses aiding and abetting
liability into a subset of primary liability would empty Central Bank of all
significance. 7' The "bright line" courts thus seek to give meaningful
effect to the Central Bank holding that Section 10(b) does not cover
66. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 ("We agree that reliance is an element of a Rule lOb-5
cause of action.").
67. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added).
68. E.g., Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
69. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2"d Cir. 1997). ("Allegations of
,assisting,' 'participating in,' 'complicity in,' and similar synonyms used throughout the
complaint all fall within the prohibitive bar of Central Bank."). See also Fisch, supra note
54, at 1302 ("[P]remising liability upon a professional's participation in a collective process
appears perilously close to the liability standard rejected by Central Bank.").
70. See Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (quoting In re MTC Electronic Technologies
Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)). See also Wright, 152 F.3d at
175 (concluding that a holding contrary to the bright line test "would effectively revive
aiding and abetting liability under a different name, and would therefore run afoul of the
Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank").
71. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
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aiding and abetting, and to ensure satisfaction of the reliance element of
a Rule 10b-5 claim.
C. The "Substantial Participation" Test
Other courts have taken a broad view of primary liability, and
concluded that secondary actors that participated in a misrepresentation
could be liable for securities fraud. For example, in one of the early post-
Central Bank decisions, the district court in In re ZZZZ Best Securities
Litigation concluded that an accountant, Ernst & Young, could be
primarily liable based on its role in the creation, review, or issuance of
allegedly fraudulent statements.72 The ZZZZ Best court concluded that
Central Bank required a secondary actor to commit deceptive acts, but
that Ernst & Young's participation in the misrepresentation was
extensive enough to attribute the misstatements to them.73
The ZZZZ Best court largely relied on pre-Central Bank decisions that
found primary liability in such contexts.74  The court also argued,
however, that even if the investing public were "not . . . able to
reasonably attribute the additional misstatements and omissions to Ernst
& Young, the securities market still relied on those public statements and
anyone intricately involved in their creation and the resulting deception
should be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5., 75 This attribution of
misrepresentations to secondary actors, with varying degrees of
participation required, has since been adopted by a number of courts,
including the Ninth Circuit.76
72. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F.Supp. 960, 964, 976 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
73. See id. at 969-70.
74. See id. at 970.
75. Id. Professor Prentice has argued that this latter reasoning is appropriate in light
of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the fraud on the market theory:
If the fraud on the market theory can be used by plaintiffs to establish the
reliance element vis-a-vis communications they have never seen, it should be
equally available to establish reliance upon the substantial participation of
defendants in those communications when that substantial participation has been
visible to the market, even though perhaps not to the particular plaintiffs.
Prentice, supra note 3, at 747. This reasoning overextends the application of the fraud on
the market theory, however. It requires courts to equate the general reliance the market
might have placed on a secondary actor's reputation to a reliance on the participant's
specific doings. This argument could capture secondary actors that fail to blow the
whistle, let alone secondary actors that participate in a fraud. Prentice concedes that a
whistle blowing duty was implicitly rejected in Central Bank. See id. at 765. This
reasoning ignores the requirement that the secondary actor's fraudulent acts must be
relied upon (here, the alleged creation of the misrepresentation)-the actor's mere
presence is not a deceptive act.
76. In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3, 629 (9th Cir. 1994);
McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., 57 F. Supp. 2d 396, 427 (E.D. Tex. 1999); Cashman v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425,432-34 (N.D. I11. 1995).
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One of the strongest arguments for this position is the common law
basis for a participation theory]7 As Professor Prentice notes, the 1943
Corpus Juris Secundum recognized fraud liability for those that
participate in a misrepresentation, M and precedents exist to support a
participation standard prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange
Act.9 It is generally accepted that the federal securities laws were
intended to provide greater protections against securities fraud than the
common law of the era.m' Commentators have proposed that the most
broad interpretation of the common law is appropriate in light of
Congress's desire to improve upon common law protections against
securities fraud."' In addition, the Supreme Court has at times followed
the common law of fraud in fleshing out the conduct prohibited under
Section 10(b). 2
D. The Mandate of the Bright Line Test
Although a participation theory is reasonable as an intuitive matter-
knowing participants in the creation of fraudulent statements participate
in a wrongful act-it does not follow that participants in the creation of
77. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 751-52.
78. According to the Corpus Juris Secundum:
One who, by fraudulent representations, induces another to act to his damage is
liable for the damages suffered, and it is not essential that there should have
been privity of contract or personal dealings; but a person cannot be held liable
for a fraudulent misrepresentation unless he made it himself or authorized
another to make it for him or in some way participated therein.
Id. (citing 37 C.J.S., Fraud § 61, at 346 (1943)).
79. For a review of pre-1934 cases evidencing the participation theory, see Prentice,
supra note 3, at 752 n.266. For additional commentary respecting the common law and
secondary liability, see generally William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the
Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and
Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313 (1988);
David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597
(1972).
80. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (concluding that
"an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived
deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of
conduct in the securities industry"). See also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22
(1988) ("Actions under Rule l0b-5 are distinct from common-law deceit and
misrepresentation claims ... and are in part designed to add to the protections provided
investors by the common law.").
81. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 3, at 714-15; Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of
Tort Law Doctrines to Rule lOb-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 96, 138 (1986) ("Congress's determination that common law
protections were deficient suggests that in the face of divided common law opinions, the
most liberal common law views of 1934 should govern.").
82. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980).
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fraudulent statements themselves commit acts that are relied upon.
Supporters of the participation theory attempt to avoid the strictures of
the reliance requirement by suggesting that the plaintiff has relied on a
misrepresentation, in part caused by the participant's acts, even if the
secondary actor did not make the statement at issue."3 This tends to
make the debate over secondary liability into a debate over proximate84
cause. However, all aiders and abettors in some sense cause the
misstatement that is relied upon, and there is no readily apparent
rationale to distinguish distant causes from more proximate ones.85
More important, the text of Section 10(b) requires the "bright line"
test. Section 10(b) only covers those who "use" or "employ" a
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance. The natural reading
of "use" or "employ" in the context of Section 10(b) means to use or
employ the device or contrivance in order to manipulate or deceive.87 If
one could "use" or "employ" a misrepresentation in the statutory sense
merely by being involved in the device's creation, then Section 10(b)
defendants could include individuals who did not intend to manipulate or
83. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 13,
Klein v. Boyd, 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,136 (3d Cir. 1998), rehearing en banc
granted, judgment vacated (Mar. 9, 1998) (Nos. 97-1143; 97-1261), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/klein.txt ("The reliance a plaintiff in a securities fraud
action must plead is reliance on a misrepresentation, not on the fact that a particular
person made that representation."); cf. Prentice, supra note 3, at 757 n.293 ("If the
misstatement or omission is attributable to defendant, as it should be if the defendant
participated substantially in its preparation or communication, then the defendant is liable
to a plaintiff who relied upon the misstatement or omission regardless of whether plaintiff
knew of defendant's role at the time of the transaction. Any other holding would,
inconsistent with the common law of fraud and deceit, reward those who can successfully
cover their tracks, at least for a time.").
84. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 5, at 892 (arguing for participation defined in
terms of proximate causation).
85. Cf Fisch, supra note 54, at 1302 ("[I]mposing liability upon outside professionals
based upon their level of participation is unpredictable and subject to an ad hoc fact-based
evaluation. The Central Bank Court expressly identified an unpredictable standard of
liability for outside professionals as undesirable."); Prentice, supra note 3, at 756
("Certainly, the term 'to participate' is vague and confusion can arise from various
formulations of the test ... Does drafting a client's communication satisfy the test? Does
partial drafting? How about editing? Proofreading? These are troubling questions,
especially given how far they run from the Supreme Court's desired bright line."). Cf.
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
87. See De Leon, supra note 5, at 739 ("The focus of the statutory text is not on the
preparation of misleading information but on putting such information to some purpose.
When a professional who is independent of a securities issuer reviews, edits, drafts or
otherwise helps prepare documents that are used by the issuer to mislead investors, the
professional himself or herself probably is not 'using or employing' a deceptive device in
violation of section 10(b).").
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deceive."9 Even if intent to deceive were present, participation in the
creation of a deceptive device is distinct from its use.
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that "use" and "employ"
have a particular meaning when read in context. In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 9 the Court concluded that Section 10(b) actions required a
showing of scienteri' It also noted that this interpretation of Section
10(b) was supported by the terms "to use or employ."9' That is, the
Court implicitly connected these verbs to their objects, manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivances. The words "use" or "employ"
support an intent requirement because to "use" or "employ" is to use or
employ in order to defraud.
Consider some hypothetical cases of attenuated participation.
Suppose a press profits by disseminating an issuer's fraudulent
disclosures. Or suppose a word processor assists with the issuer's
computer programs, indirectly enabling the fraud to occur. The role in
the deception in each case is incidental, even if the parties should have
known (or did know) that the statements were false. As a semantic
matter, these parties have in some attenuated sense "used" the deceptive
device, for profit even, but these parties have not "used" a deceptive
device in the sense of Section 10(b). It is not these parties' "use" of
deception, but rather their participation in someone else's fraud, which
can be said to cause injury.
Even where the participation is more impressive, and the causation
more proximate, the same weakness will exist. For example, an
accountant with an unattributed role in preparing an issuer's misleading
disclosure has not "used" a deceptive device. Whatever degree of
participation is demonstrated, if someone else's statements do the
deceiving, the participant still cannot be said to "use" the device to
88. Cf Fischel, supra note 5, at 88 ("The Supreme Court [in Hochfelder] reversed the
Seventh Circuit's holding that the accounting firm was liable as an aider and abettor
because the plaintiff had failed to allege that it had acted with scienter as required by the
,manipulative or deceptive' language of section 10(b). However, under a strict aiding and
abetting analysis, it is irrelevant whether an aider and abettor has engaged in a
manipulative or deceptive practice within the meaning of section 10(b)."). Under a
"participation" analysis, the same holds true. It is irrelevant whether the participant has
engaged in a manipulative or deceptive practice; instead the manipulative or deceptive
practice is attributed to the secondary actor as if it had manipulated or deceived. See id. at
108 & n.152 (noting that deceptive conduct by secondary actors should still continue to be
prohibited by section 10(b)).
89. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
90. Id. at 201.
91. Id. at 199 n.20 ("The Commission also ignores the use of the terms '[t]o use or
employ,' language that is supportive of the view that Congress did not intend § 10(b) to
embrace negligent conduct.").
92. See id.
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deceive. Judicial attribution of a misleading statement will still require
that the party made the statement.
The above arguments do not entirely eliminate liability for secondary
actors participating in a misrepresentation. Secondary actors may also
make primary statements, such as when an accountant certifies a
•• 93
fraudulent SEC filing. Similarly, if a secondary actor has had direct
contact with the defrauded party, and if these acts give the impression
that the secondary actor specifically vouches for the misstatements, then
the secondary actor's participation may qualify for primary liability, to
the extent that the secondary actor has made the misstatements his or
her own. 94 The source of the primary liability is that the secondary actor
in a sense made the statement relied upon, even though its express
utterance comes from the issuer.9
A secondary actor may also be liable when it uses the maker of a
statement as its agent. 6  In this case, one may rightly say that the
principal made the statement, albeit through an "indirect" source]97
93. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990) ("When an
accountant certifies that a firm's financial statements 'present fairly' its financial position
• . . it is certifying the absence of materially misleading omissions, a source of primary
liability. If it acts with the necessary mental state, the case for direct liability is
complete.").
94. Cf Langevoort, supra note 5, at 888-89.
95. Prior to Central Bank, the Sixth Circuit had described a "direct contact" test for
determining when there is a primary violation. See e.g., Molecular Tech. Corp. v.
Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 917 (6th Cir. 1991). Such a theory can be squared with Central
Bank to the extent there is deceptive conduct by the secondary actor-not mere reliance
on a secondary actor simply because it is the issuer's accountant or law firm. The statute
requires a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.
96. See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d
Cir. 2001) (finding corporate defendants liable based on misrepresentations made by their
agent, and noting "[tihe fact that DeRoziere, or any other agent of the corporate
defendants, may have supplied the report does not preclude them from primary liability.
A corporation can only act through its employees and agents ... and an allegation that a
particular agent may have doctored or conveyed the report will not immunize the
principals from liability for a knowing deception."). Agency liability should not be
confused with respondeat superior liability, which is secondary liability and incompatible
with the holding in Central Bank. Cf. Fischel, supra note 5, at 106-07 n.145 (noting
absence of manipulative or deceptive act in respondeat superior cases). The respondeat
superior theory is not based on a showing that an employer made a misrepresentation, but
rather shifts responsibility for the misrepresentations of employees. Employers are still
potentially subject to liability for misrepresentations made by corporate employees, which
Congress addressed through the "controlling person" provision of the Exchange Act,
section 20(a).
97. It is debatable whether an alleged conspiracy may fit into this mold. For a broad
interpretation of conspiracy liability along these lines, see James D. Cox, Just Deserts for
Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 528-32 (1996). It
is certainly arguable that under a conspiracy to commit fraud, the fraudulent acts can be
attributed to a co-conspirator. However, in the typical case of secondary actors (other
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Indeed, recognition of agency liability appropriately gives meaning to the
terms "directly or indirectly," found in Section 10(b).98 Such agency
liability, however, would not apply to the typical instance of an
accountant, lawyer, or underwriter involved in the disclosure process. To
the contrary, these secondary actors are agents of the issuer, not the
other way around.
The existence of liability for some secondary actors is consistent with a
strict reading of the scope of Section 10(b), requiring that the participant
commit a deceptive act that was relied upon. In contrast, the mere
creation or facilitation of a deceptive device that someone else will use to
deceive is not the same thing as using the deceptive device. As noted in
Central Bank, participants may be liable to the extent that they
independently meet the elements for primary liability.9
E. The Common Law of Fraud
Nonetheless, some may argue that the scope of Section 10(b) should
include participants because they were included within the scope of
common law fraud. Where the common law fills in the gaps left by the
concise language in Section 10(b), it is appropriate to turn to it for
insight, inasmuch as the statute indicates a common law grounding. This
than control persons within the corporation), this form of conspiracy would not exist.
Accountants, for example, do not generally reach agreements to defraud the public, even
in those cases where they knowingly assist in creating a misrepresentation. Also troubling
is the possibility of recasting every aiding and abetting claim as a conspiracy claim-a
concern recognized by the lower courts. Cf Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent,
Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 843 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[R]ecognition of a cause of action
for conspiracy would not only conflict with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Central
Bank, but would largely undo the effect of that decision itself, inasmuch as many aiding
and abetting claims would simply be repleaded as conspiracy claims."). A conspiracy
liability premised on tacit agreement to aid someone who is committing fraud would likely
run afoul of Central Bank's restrictions. If conspiracy liability were viable in this context,
it would entail a test sufficiently stringent that the typical aiding and abetting claim would
be excluded.
98. In Central Bank, the Court rejected an apparent argument by the SEC that
Congress's provision for Section 10(b) liability, where the defendant acted "directly or
indirectly", provided a textual basis for aiding and abetting liability. See Central Bank, 511
U.S. at 176 ("The problem, of course, is that aiding and abetting liability extends beyond
persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding and abetting liability
reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a
degree of aid to those who do."). The language has since been argued as support for an
agency theory. Cf. Prentice, supra note 3, at 730-32; Thomas L. Riesenberg, Fraud Claims
Against Professionals After Central Bank, INSIGHTS, 9, 14 (Feb. 1995). Professor Fischel
notes a plausible alternative meaning for the language, however-"that it allows liability
to be imposed upon a defendant even though such defendant does not himself use the
jurisdictional means (i.e., mail a letter in interstate commerce)." Fischel, supra note 5, at
95 n.83.
99. See Central Bank. 511 U.S. at 191.
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occurred in the case of United States v. Chiarella, for example. "" There,
the Court concluded, following the common law of fraud, that a
securities fraud defendant in a nondisclosure case must owe a duty to the
plaintiff in order for there to be liability."0
On the other hand, when the text sets forth a narrower, more limited
regime than that recognized at common law, the text prevails, as it did in
Central Bank."2 Congress is often understood to legislate against a pre-
existing common law understanding of statutory terms of art. Even so,
statutory text need not track common law causes of action, and
sometimes does not. The Central Bank case, for example, rejected a
common law theory for an implied aiding and abetting action."3
Where the text actually conflicts with common law understandings,
courts should not distort the statutory language to bring it into harmony
with the common law. Professor Prentice has argued for a broad
"participation" test on the theory that common law courts recognized
such liability as primary before the Central Bank decision."" Post-
enactment cases, of course, provide limited insight into what Congress
meant in 1934, when Section 10(b) was enacted.""5 Even pre-enactment
common law decisions, however, conflict with the text of Section 10(b) to
the extent they avoid the statutory requirement that a securities
defendant use or employ a deceptive device or contrivance.
The efforts to advocate a broad participation standard based on
common law understandings of primary liability bear a strong
resemblance to arguments rejected by the Supreme Court in Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates."7 There, the Court addressed the question of whether
ERISA plan participants could bring actions to obtain money damages
against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participated in a fiduciary's breach
of duty. ... The Court concluded that such damages did not constitute
"appropriate equitable relief" as set forth by the relevant statutory
100. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980).
101. See id. at 227-28 (looking to, among other things, the common law and
Restatement (Second) of Torts to support a holding that omission claims are only
available against individuals with a duty to disclose).
102. Cf Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 181-84.
103. Id. ("Even assuming, moreover, a deeply rooted background of aiding and
abetting tort liability, it does not follow that Congress intended to apply that kind of
liability to the private causes of action in the securities Acts.").
104. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 751-52.
105. Cf. id. at 752 n.267 (citing post-1934 cases finding liability for participants in
fraud).
106. Cf. supra note 79.
107. 508 U.S. 248, 261-63 (1993).
108. Id. at 249-50.
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provision, and accordingly, that they were unavailable."" In so holding,
the Court rejected an argument that its strict textual interpretation of
"equitable relief" was incorrect because money damages would have
been available at common law." "
The Mertens Court found the statutory text decisive. It was thus
untroubled by the possibility that ERISA actually offered less protection
to beneficiaries than the pre-existing common law."' As the Court
noted, "vague notions of a statute's 'basic purpose' are nonetheless
inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue
under consideration. ,112
III. THE SEC'S Co-AUTHORSHIP TEST
A recent effort to expand liability to participants emphasizes the
degree of a secondary actor's participation."3  In 1995, Professor
Langevoort proposed a "participation" test based on the extent of a
secondary party's participation in drafting a misleading statement. As he
explained:
My suggestion is that the notion of participation or involvement
in these cases be redefined in terms of proximate causation or a
broad notion of "co-authorship." Any person who plays a
significant role in the formulation of a disclosure document or
other form of publicity that contains a material misstatement or
omission should be liable as a primary violator if he or she acted
with the requisite degree of scienter and all the other
requirements for Rule 10b-5 liability are met. A significant role
is one in which the person is invited, expected, or is otherwise in
a position to affect the form or content of the disclosure-where
the person has the ability to influence its capacity to deceive.
This could take the form of drafting, editing, or providing
information. 14
109. See id. at 255-61.
110. See id. at 255-60. As the Court stated:
Regarding "equitable" relief in § 502(a)(3) to mean "all relief available for
breach of trust at common law" would also require us either to give the term a
different meaning there than it bears elsewhere in ERISA, or to deprive of all
meaning the distinction Congress drew between "equitable" and "remedial"
relief in § 409(a) ....
Id. at 258.
111. Seeid. at 261-62.
112. Id. at 261.
113. Langevoort,supra note 5, at 891-92.
114. See id. at 892. Professor Langevoort appears to recognize that his interpretation
is in tension with Central Bank, and even in conflict with Central Bank dicta regarding
primary liability. See id. at 891 (stating that holdings that use a broader approach to
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The SEC has since adopted a co-authorship theory. In Klein v. Boyd," ' a
Third Circuit panel applied this reasoning to hold a secondary party
liable for an issuer's misrepresentation." 6 The Third Circuit granted
rehearing en banc, vacating the panel's opinion."7 As amicus, the SEC
filed a brief supporting the co-authorship view."8 Although the parties
settled prior to a decision by the full circuit, this brief was subsequently
incorporated into the SEC's amicus brief in the Enron litigation."9
As with other participation theories, the reliance requirement is fatal
to this theory because creation of a misrepresentation alone does not
cause deception. In the context of a misrepresentation case, the
misrepresentation itself is the deceptive device. The rough draft of the
misrepresentation as such, no matter if every word were written by a
secondary actor, is not a deceptive device. As noted, one might seek to
avoid this requirement by showing that the actions of the party that made
the misrepresentation were attributable as actions of the secondary
party."2 However, the SEC's proposed theory of "co-authorship" is not
based on a premise that the party that actually made the
misrepresentations was the agent of the secondary actor. '
The appeal of the co-authorship test is that it superficially appears to
fit into the requirements of Central Bank. Rule 10b-5, subsection (b),
sets forth liability where a party "make[s]" a misleading statement.1
22
The Central Bank Court, when it noted that secondary actors could be
primary liability "allow for substantial revisionism."); id. at 892 (suggesting that the
proposed participation test may not be entirely faithful to Justice Kennedy's apparent
intent in Central Bank).
115. Klein v. Boyd, 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 90,136 (3d Cir. 1998), rehearing en
banc granted, judgment vacated (Mar. 9, 1998).
116. Id. at 90,318.
117. Id.
118. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Klein v. Boyd,
1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 90,136 (3d Cir. 1998), rehearing en banc granted, judgment
vacated (Mar. 9, 1998) (Nos. 97-1143; 97-1261), available at http:llwww.sec.gov/litigationl
briefs/klein.txt.
119. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 585-
86 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ("The majority of [the SEC's] pleading is a submission filed on behalf
of the plaintiffs in a case that was pending in the Third Circuit, but which was settled
before that appellate court could review the issue en banc.").
120. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
121. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 10,
(setting forth the broad view that "[a] person who creates a misrepresentation, but takes
care not to be identified publicly with it, 'indirectly' uses or employs a deceptive device or
contrivance and should be liable").
122. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003) (stating in subsection (b) that it shall be unlawful
"[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading").
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liable, suggested that parties would be liable if they "make[] a material
misstatement" on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies.'23 The
Central Bank majority's use of the word "make" almost certainly meant
to "communicate" or "utter" the misstatement. Nevertheless, it is
semantically possible to say that a creator of a statement "makes" the
statement. 1
24
The SEC argued, in effect, that "creating" a statement is equivalent to
"making" a statement.1 21 In context, this understanding is implausible. If
one asks who made the statements in this article, the answer is the
author, not the publisher or an anonymous ghostwriter. If the President
gives a speech, and someone asks who made his statements, the answer is
that the President made the statements, even if they were drafted by a
speech writer. The same goes for judicial opinions, drafted sometimes by
law clerks. To "make" a statement is to utter it (or the printed
equivalent)-no matter who drafted the words. In short, the "co-
authorship" test is not different in kind from the other participation tests.
One who participates a great deal in preparing a misstatement, but does
nothing more than participate, cannot be primarily liable.
IV. RULE 10b-5 AND THE ZANDFORD DECISION
Another possible means to avoid the ambit of Central Bank is to look
126to subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5. Because "scheme" and
"course of business" liability under those subsections does not require
misrepresentations, a secondary actor may arguably be found to commit
fraudulent acts by participating in the creation of a misrepresentation
without making a misrepresentation himself. The participation would
allegedly qualify as part of a scheme or course of business, which acted as
a fraud. Since the scheme or course of business is relied upon, reliance
on the statements of the secondary actors is unnecessary.
123. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 ("Any person or entity, including a lawyer,
accountant, or bank, who ... makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under Rule 10b-
5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met."). The
SEC in effect severs the maker of the statement from the making of the statement. See
SEC Brief. supra note 18, at 13 ("[T]he [Central Bank] Court placed the focus on the
misrepresentation, not on the fact that a particular person made it.").
124. Such a rule still entails limits. See, e.g., Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. Anixter, 256
F.Supp. 2d 806, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
125. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 16 ("The
Commission believes that a test that looks to what a secondary actor does in 'creating a
misrepresentation' provides the appropriate focus for determining when the secondary
actor 'makes' a misrepresentation.").
126. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2003).
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A number of State Attorneys General filed an amicus brief in the
Enron litigation, arguing that secondary actors could be liable based on
participation in Enron's alleged fraud, under parts (a) and (c) of Rule
10b-5.27  The Enron Court rejected this theory to the extent that it
sought to extend liability to participants in a scheme based on others'
conduct even if the participants did not commit a key act that itself
violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.'2 However, the Court agreed that
"liability is not limited to the making of a material misstatement or
omission, nor to a few very technical forms of manipulation."'2"9 The
theory that section (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 can expand liability to
secondary actors in misrepresentation cases is not new."" A new
development is the Supreme Court's recent opinion in SEC v.
Zandford,'3 ' which endorsed all three subsections of Rule 10b-5.'32
In Zandford, the Court addressed the requirement under Section 10(b)
that a manipulative or deceptive act be made "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of a security. 33 The respondent broker, Zandford, had
defrauded an elderly man, Mr. Wood, who had opened an investment
account for himself and his daughter."34  Zandford misappropriated
127. See Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the State Attorneys General Relating to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 10-16, In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549
(2002) (No. H-01-3624); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
128. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 589
n.31 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 971-72 (C.D. Cal. 1994);
see also Prentice, supra note 3, at 754 (citing subsections (a) and (c) for the proposition
that participation theories are acceptable readings of the statutory text).
131. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
132. See id. at 819-20, 825. Cf Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the State Attorneys
General Relating to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 10, In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig.,
235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (2002) (No. H-01-3624). The brief stated:
The Supreme Court just one week ago [in Zandford] reconfirmed what the Court
and the federal circuit courts of appeals have long recognized-that the scope of
liability under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule lOb-5 is broader than that under
subsection (b) and that those who engage in a fraudulent scheme may be held
liable in the absence of misrepresentations and omissions.
Id. But cf De Leon, supra note 5, at 728. As Mr. De Leon explained:
In the context of Rule 1Ob-5 actions alleging misleading disclosure by securities
issuers, the language of the second subsection-'make [an] untrue statement of a
material fact or ... omit to state a material fact'-appears to define the widest
scope of conduct prohibited by a third party professional under Rule 10b-5. The
first and third subsections of Rule 10b-5, which use the verbs 'employ' and
,engage,' have narrower meanings than the second subsection.
Id.
133. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819.
134. Id. at 815.
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Wood's money by selling the securities in the account and then
transferring the proceeds to his own account.
35
The SEC claimed that Zandford engaged in a fraudulent scheme in
which he made sales of his customer's securities for his own benefit.'
36
Zandford defended himself against claims of securities fraud on the
theory that the sales themselves were lawful, and that the subsequent
misappropriation, although fraudulent, did not have a connection with
the sale of the securities.'3 7 He compared his scheme to a mere theft of
cash from an investment account.' 38 The Supreme Court disagreed.
According to the Zandford court, "[tihe securities sales and
respondent's fraudulent practices were not independent events.''
1 3
Instead, the fraud perpetrated by the respondent was directly linked to
the sales themselves. 4 1 In so holding, the Court applied sections (a) and
(c) of Rule 10b-5, which address "scheme" and "course of business"
liability. 4 1 It is this latter, unremarkable aspect of Zandford which is
apparently urged as proof that the Supreme Court recognizes a broad
reading of Rule 10b-5 that would include participation theories of
liability.
The State Attorneys General amicus brief in the Enron litigation noted
that Zandford had confirmed the existence of "scheme" liability. 42 The
brief added that the Court had expressly approved all subsections of
Rule 10b-5 when it stated that "[t]he scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive
with the coverage of § 10(b).' 43 This judicial approval, however, may
not expand Section 10(b)'s scope via acceptance of an extensive Rule
10b-5.
As the Hochfelder decision makes clear, Section 10(b) controls the
proper reading of Rule 10b-5, not the reverse.'" The real issue posed by
adoption of subsections (a) and (c) is what type of "scheme" or "course
of business" will satisfy the strictures of Section 10(b). In this regard,
135. Id.
136. Id. at 820.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 820.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 819 (quoting subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5).
142. Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the State Attorneys General Relating to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 12, In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549
(2002) (No. H-01-3624).
143. Id. (quoting Zandford, 535 U.S. at 816 n.1).
144. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) ("[d]espite the broad
view of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the
power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b)."). The Hochfelder Court was
addressing an overly broad reading of subsections (a) and (c) when it made this point.
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Zandford is simply not on point. 45 Zandford was not a case that tested
the limits of subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 for secondary actors.
Although Rule 10b-5 can be read broadly when all of its subsections are
adopted, Zandford addressed a different issue under Section 10(b)-the
"in connection with" requirement.46
Nothing in the Zandford opinion suggests that the Court would accept
"scheme" or "course of business" liability as a means of regulating
secondary actors that assist in the creation of another actor's
misrepresentation. Both subsections can readily be understood to
prohibit deceptive conduct that does not involve misrepresentations, or
even prohibit misrepresentations that are part of a scheme, without also
prohibiting participation in misrepresentations. 4  Zandford was a
unanimous decision,40 joined by all five justices in the Central Bank
majority.4 9 It is unlikely these justices used Zandford as an opportunity
to curtail their holding in Central Bank.
The key to resolving whether a secondary actor's involvement creates
primary liability is the same regardless of which provision of rule 10b-5 is
at issue. One must determine what conduct was manipulative or
deceptive, and then determine whether the secondary actor used or
employed the manipulative or deceptive conduct. In the context of a
misrepresentation, the secondary actor's actions will typically be relied
upon only in those instances where the secondary actor made an
independent statement or the misrepresentation is attributable through
the law of agency.""
145. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 815 (stating that the issue was "whether the alleged
fraudulent conduct was 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security' within the
meaning of the statute and the Rule"). Cf Tricontinental Industries, 256 F.Supp.2d at 807.
146. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822 ("The question presented is whether the alleged
fraudulent conduct was 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security' within the
meaning of the statute and the Rule.").
147. Cf In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp.2d 161, 173 (D. Mass. 2003).
Lernout noted:
[Tihe better reading of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is that they impose primary
liability on any person who substantially participates in a manipulative or
deceptive scheme by directly or indirectly employing a manipulative or deceptive
device (like the creation or financing of a sham entity) intended to mislead
investors, even if a material misstatement by another person creates the nexus
between the scheme and the securities market.
Id.
148. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 814.
149. Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 166 (1994).
150. Cf Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) ("[u]nder the
circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery."). In non-misrepresentation cases involving a
failure to disclose, reliance is presumed. Id. at 153-54. But such cases involve an
obligation to disclose combined with a withholding of material facts that amounts to
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If a secondary actor did not make a misstatement, yet participated in a
fraudulent scheme, the defrauded party must still have relied upon some
act by the secondary actor. As one court aptly noted:
[T]he only way for a plaintiff to prevail against a defendant that
does not make a false and misleading statement is to identify
another of its actions, such as a "deceptive device or fraud,"
that triggers liability under one of 10b-5's other two prongs.
In short, subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 do not create a
short cut to circumvent Central Bank's limitations on liability
for a secondary actor's involvement in preparing misleading
documents. 5'
In other words, if it is a misrepresentation that deceived the plaintiff,
then subsections (a) and (c) do not expand the potential parties subject
to liability.
V. AMBIGUITY IN SECTION 10(b) AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
A. The Problem of Ambiguity in Section 10(b)
It is conceivable that courts, including the Supreme Court, will find
Section 10(b) ambiguous on the question of liability for secondary actors.
Such a finding of ambiguity would be unsurprising.'12 The common law
precedent discussed above could encourage this conclusion. Moreover,
though the text and relevant Supreme Court precedents are sufficiently
clear to preclude a participation theory, participation theories are not
absolutely excluded by the statutory language. For reasons developed
below, any such ambiguity should be construed narrowly, to limit the
private action.
/. Chevron Deference after the Mead Decision
An initial issue in addressing this question is the level of deference due
the SEC's interpretation. The Enron court apparently applied some
form of deference to the SEC's interpretation on liability for secondary
causation in fact. Id. at 154. In misrepresentation cases, the Supreme Court has made
clear that reliance is a requirement for private actions. If one expands the Affiliated Ute
theory broadly enough to encompass assistance in a misrepresentation, aiding and abetting
liability is readily subsumed within primary liability. This result would be inconsistent
with Central Bank.
151. In re Lernout, 230 F. Supp. 2d 161, 174-75 (D. Mass. 2003).
152. A proposed reason for the broad participation theories of liability in lower courts
is an "equilibrium" theory. See Langevoort, supra note 5, at 887. If accurate, this theory
suggests that it is not so much ambiguity that created the circuit split, as a judicial
skepticism with Central Bank, producing an effort by lower courts to return to the status
quo.
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actors. 153 In appropriate cases the agency's interpretation of ambiguous
or silent text is owed deference if it is reasonable. 54 The Zandford
Court, in an SEC civil action, accepted this proposition when interpreting
ambiguities in Section 10(b).'55
The usual starting point for addressing agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes administered by the agency is the Supreme Court's
guidance in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.56  Chevron set forth a two step process for resolving such
questions. First, the Court considers whether Congress has directly
addressed the specific question at issue in the case: "If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.' 5" Second, if the statute is ambiguous or silent as to the
specific issue, then the court must defer to a reasonable agency
interpretation of the statute, even if that interpretation is not the one
which the court would choose. 5"9
Commentators have proffered several justifications for the holding in
Chevron. Some argue that Chevron is a judicially-created, prudential
canon of interpretation," while others assert that separation-of-powers
153. See supra note 20. It is unclear from the Enron opinion precisely how much
deference may have been granted. The court cites to Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642
(1998); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44, Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27, and Zandford. These cases
do not all stand for the same level of judicial deference. The Bragdon cite suggests a more
limited deference, see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), while Chevron and
Zandford imply the Enron court applied Chevron deference. Mead, as discussed below,
addresses both standards. See infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
154. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 588
(S.D. Tex 2002) ("Because § 10(b) expressly delegated rule-making authority to the
agency, which it exercised inter alia in promulgating Rule lOb-5, this Court accords
considerable weight to the SEC's construction of the statute since the Court finds that
construction is not arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute."); id. at 589
(citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001)).
155. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002) ("This [SEC] interpretation of
the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to
deference if it is reasonable.")
156. See 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
157. Id. at 842.
158. Id. at 842-43.
159. See id. at 843 ("If, however, the court determines that Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.").
160. Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of
Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 1275, 1289-94 (1991).
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concerns support placing the interpretive responsibility in this context
with the executive branch. 6' Finally, some contend that Chevron rests
upon a judicial presumption of legislative intent.1
2
The recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp.'61
grounds Chevron deference in the third understanding-congressional
intent.'64 In Mead, the Court addressed the question of whether tariff
classification rulings by the Customs Service merited Chevron
deference. 1  The Court ultimately concluded that Chevron deference
was not appropriate, but that a less-exacting form of deference, Skidmore
deference, might apply.66 Chevron deference applies only in cases where
an agency interpretation has the "force of law.' 6 7 Skidmore deference,
which effectively calls for courts to defer to agency interpretations that
are persuasive, would apply based upon various factors, such as the
agency's specialized experience.'
As the Mead Court explained Chevron, "administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority."'
6
161. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the
Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 269, 280-04 (1988); Kenneth W.
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 308-09 (1986).
162. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 870-72 (2001). But cf. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625 (1996)
(noting that Chevron applies retroactively to pre-Chevron statutes, and that "[w]hatever
else one might say about a retroactive shift in interpretive norms, such a change cannot
reflect a vindication of congressional expectations about the way its statutes will be
construed.").
163. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
164. See id. at 229 (discussing Congress's implicit expectation of deference based on
generally conferred agency authority and other statutory circumstances). See also id. at
230 n.1 1 (quoting Merrill & Hickman, supra note 162, at 872, for the proposition that if
Chevron rests on a presumption about congressional intent: "it is therefore important to
determine whether a plausible case can be made that Congress would want such a
delegation to mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority"). For a more
in depth discussion of the intent question in Mead, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead
Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807,
812-19 (2002).
165. Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
166. Id. at 234-39. The more deferential Skidmore standard was first articulated in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
167. Id. at 226-27. See also Merrill, supra note 164, at 826-33 (proposing means to
identify when Congress has delegated the power to act with the force of law).
168. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235.
169. Id. at 226-27.
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2. Implications for Section 10(b)
Properly read, Mead is a potential limitation on the SEC's interpretive
role in the private litigation context.'7  But this is not merely because the
SEC amicus briefs lack the force of law.17' Mead squarely places Chevron
deference within the rubric of congressional intent.'17  The Supreme
Court has made clear its understanding that an implied right of action
under Section 10(b) does not reflect congressional intent. '7 To find that
Congress intended to implicitly delegate to the SEC the authority to fill
gaps in the judicially created private right of action is logically
inconsistent. 174
This presents an interesting interpretive problem. The text of Section
10(b) provides a broad delegation of rulemaking authority to the SEC.171
Section 10(b) is without effect, but for SEC rulemaking.' 76  Generally
speaking, appropriate SEC interpretations of Section 10(b) merit
170. But cf In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549,
588 n.29 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Mead regarding Chevron deference).
171. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. See also Grundfest, supra note 36, at
984 n.89 (noting format concerns respecting SEC support of a private action "because the
Commission has not incorporated its own position supporting private rights into Rule 10b-
5, and because the Commission has expressed its position solely through amicus briefs,
Congressional testimony, and speeches by Commissioners").
172. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229, 230 n.11, 231-32, 234, 236, 238 (referencing congressional
intent). As Professor Merrill notes, "[t]hroughout the opinion, the Court refers to
congressional intent, expectations, contemplations, thoughts, and objectives." Merrill,
supra note 164, at 812.
173. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
174. A response might be that it is equally clear that Congress did not intend to
delegate these questions to the courts. Chevron can be seen as a determination that
interpretive lawmaking is better delegated to a more representative institution than the
courts. See Manning, supra note 162, at 634 (suggesting that Chevron respects "a
constitutional commitment to [lawmaking] by more, rather than less, representative
institutions (agencies rather than courts)"). I would suggest that where the court has
already engaged in such a self-delegation, by recognizing an unintended private right of
action, it is not improper for the court to take on the concomitant responsibility of
cabining the right of action within common law and statutory boundaries-e.g., limiting
the opportunities for interpretive lawmaking. This is not an additional self-delegation by
the judiciary, but rather a limitation of a delegation that already occurred. Should the
SEC wish to further narrow those bounds, the text of Section 10(b) permits it to do so. See
Grundfest, supra note 36, at 975-77. In addition, the Supreme Court has already
determined that to some degree the elaboration of the private right of action is a judicial
responsibility. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1993)
("We are not alone in recognizing a judicial authority to shape, within limits, the 1Ob-5
cause of action.").
175. Grundfest, supra note 36, at 1018-20.
176. Grundfest, supra note 5, at 56.
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deference if they are reasonable, as the Zandford Court rightly noted."'
To the extent that the private right of action is conceived as a suit for
injury based on a violation of Rule 10b-5, the question of the scope of
Section 10(b) could arguably invoke Chevron deference. 7
One might conclude that Chevron applies to the private right of action
in all respects, through the indirect means of the SEC's authority to
promulgate Rule 10b-5 and interpret Section 10(b). The distinction
between deferring to the SEC in its interpretation of Section 10(b)
generally, versus its interpretation of Section 10(b) in the context of a
private cause of action, would then be illusory. From this perspective,
the private cause of action is an empty vessel, filled by the content of the
SEC's Rule 10b-5 interpretation.
This perspective, however, would overlook the judicial role in creating
the private right of action.' 79  Although the private right of action
depends on the content of Rule 10b-5, a rule which is a product of a
delegation to the SEC, the private action itself represents a product of
judicial lawmaking rather than agency rulemaking. Congress delegated
authority to the SEC to prohibit certain conduct-it did not delegate
authority to create private rights of action. The question of how far to
extend the private action is in essence a question of federal common law.
Recognition that this as a question for the courts does not encroach on
the proper sphere of agencies.""' A court deciding the question of
whether to expand the implied action is constrained by the judicial
doctrine that the scope of the private right should not "grow beyond the
scope congressionally intended."'' Agencies, by contrast, focus their
concern on policy, and tend to interpret their authority expansively.""
177. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002) ("This [SEC]
interpretation of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is
entitled to deference if it is reasonable."). See also Nat Stern, The Constitutionalization of
Rule lOb-5, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 23-25 (1995) (arguing for deference to SEC's legislative
interpretations where Section 10(b)'s meaning is uncertain unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to the statute).
178. Deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations involves a related
doctrine, Seminole Rock deference. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
413-14 (1945). See also Manning, supra note 162, at 654-55 (discussing separation of
powers implications of Seminole Rock). However, as the question here involves the scope
of conduct under Section 10(b), and not the proper interpretation of Rule 10b-5, Seminole
Rock deference is not at issue.
179. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
180. Cf Manning, supra note 162, at 626-27 (discussing the structural concern that
policymaking discretion be vested in agencies, which are more accountable, rather than in
courts).
181. Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, Inc., 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991).
182. Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 964 (1993) (discussing
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Because of the unusual source of the private right of action (not based on
congressional intent), the former interpretive concern should come prior
to the agency's policy concerns.
A court does not self-delegate when it addresses the scope of the
private action-the implication of the private action in the first place was
the self-delegation. Discerning limits on the private action is potentially
a form of judicial restraint. At the same time, a judicial holding
respecting the scope of the private action should still leave discretion to
the agency in deciding whether or not to extend private actions to all
possible cases recognized as permissible by judicial interpretation of
Section 10(b).'83
There is arguably precedent of non-deference in the private right of
action context, albeit without discussion of the Chevron doctrine. 18 In
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,"" the Supreme
Court considered what statute of limitations applied to the Section 10(b)
private right of action."' The Court recognized that Section 10(b) was
silent as to this issue,17 and concluded that statutes of limitations used in
parallel provisions of the Securities Exchange Act should be adopted."""
It also rejected the SEC's contention that a different, five year statute of
limitations, used in another section of the Securities Exchange Act,
should be adopted. 9 In rejecting the SEC's interpretation, Lampf
cannot readily be squared with Chevron deference.
It has been suggested that Central Bank presents a similar instance of
non-deference.'9" Although the Central Bank Court reached its decision
by relying on the text of Section 10(b), which it concluded was
unambiguous, the Court noted that it would have reached the same
incentives of regulators to avoid bright line rules). There is also evidence in judicial
opinions to suggest that the SEC has taken broad interpretations of its authority under
Section 10(b). Grundfest, supra note 5, at 56 (noting "a substantial body of precedent
suggesting that the agency has a tendency to construe its authority under section 10(b) far
too generously").
183. See generally Grundfest, supra note 36.
184. See Stern, supra note 177, at 27-28 (suggesting non-deference in several Supreme
Court cases was in tension with Chevron).
185. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
186. Id. at 352.
187. See id. at 358-59 (stating that in light of judicial creation of the private right of
action, "[i]t is ... no surprise that the provision contains no statute of limitations.").
188. See id. at 359 ("We can imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would
have balanced the policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the
balance struck by the same Congress in limiting similar and related protections.").
189. See id. at 361 (rejecting the five-year period contained in § 20A).
190. This argument is suggested by Stern, supra note 177, at 27-28.
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conclusion if the text of Section 10(b) did not resolve the case.' The
Court also rejected the SEC's arguments for a broad interpretation that
would permit aiding and abetting liability. 92 It is possible that the Court
considered the SEC's arguments to be unreasonable, but it is certainly
plausible to conclude that, assuming the text did not control, the Court
was unwilling to defer to the SEC's interpretation. This result would
conflict with Chevron deference as well.
Further, not all gaps or ambiguities in a statutory scheme are equal.
As Professors Merrill and Hickman note, "it has never been maintained
that Congress would want courts to give Chevron deference to an
agency's determination that it is entitled to Chevron deference."' 93
Applying Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of a statutory
ambiguity that would expand the scope of its jurisdiction raises concerns
respecting the law-interpreting role of courts.' 4 These concerns intensify
where the expansion would run contrary to the intent of Congress.
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,'9 ' the Court drew a
distinction between "ordinary" gaps in statutory language and
"extraordinary" ones. 96  The "extraordinary" gap in Brown &
Williamson involved FDA authority to regulate tobacco, an authority
which the Court concluded Congress had not provided. 1 7 In the case of
such "extraordinary" gaps, Chevron deference may be unavailable.'96
One reading of Brown & Williamson proposes that the opinion supports
non-deference where ambiguities exist respecting the scope of an
agency's jurisdiction.' 99  Whether the Brown & Williamson Court
191. See Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 178 (1994)
("Because this case concerns the conduct prohibited by § 10(b), the statute itself resolves
the case, but even if it did not, we would reach the same result.").
192. See id. at 176, 188, 190-91.
193. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 162, at 910.
194. Cf. id. at 909-912.
195. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
196. See id. at 159. The Court explained:
Deference under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute that it
administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps....
In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before
concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.
Id. (citation omitted).
197. See id. at 159-61.
198. See id.
199. Professors Merrill and Hickman propose this interpretation as one of two
readings of Brown & Williamson:
On this reading, the Court in effect said that the presumption of delegated
interpretative power is overcome if the totality of the circumstances suggests
Congress had a contrary intention. If the legal issue as to which Congress was
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effectively created an exception to Chevron deference for such
"extraordinary" gaps is debatable.' " However, the Brown & Williamson
holding resulted from a conclusion that Congress did not intend the
agency's statutory interpretation.2 "
In light of judicial precedent concluding that in 1934, Congress never
contemplated a Section 10(b) private action,2' 2 any agency interpretation
of the scope of prohibited conduct in the private litigation context is
dubious to the extent it produces a new private action. The legislative
silence in Section 10(b) on the issue of private actions can be
characterized as an "extraordinary" instance of silence. If the Court had
never created a private action, and the SEC instead had created one
based on an alleged delegation of authority, Chevron deference would
have been inappropriate.4
This view may be objected to on the grounds that the scope of conduct
prohibited by Section 10(b) should be interpreted consistently for both
private actions and enforcement actions.0 4 Congress amended Section
silent is an "ordinary" one, the usual presumption that Congress intended the
agency to resolve such issue prevails. However, if the legal question as to which
Congress is silent is "extraordinary," then this congressional silence should be
interpreted to mean that the agency is not entitled to mandatory deference.
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 162, at 845. Although the statutory circumstances are
quite distinct as between Brown & Williamson and Section 10(b), the idea that
congressional silence in certain instances should not be presumed to equal a delegation to
agency resolution is certainly relevant to the issues addressed here.
200. See id. (proposing an alternative reading, that the Brown & Williamson Court was
reinforcing its conclusion that the controversy was properly resolved at Chevron step one).
201. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60.
202. See supra note 35.
203. Justices Scalia and Brennan disputed whether Chevron applied to ambiguities in
the scope of agency jurisdiction in Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore,
487 U.S. 354 (1988). See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 162, at 909-10. The competing
theories of liability for secondary actors could implicate this debate. I would contend that
the context of an unintended private action tips the balance in Justice Brennan's favor.
Justice Scalia's concern with the practical consequences for Chevron deference of an
exception for scope of jurisdiction questions should be secondary to the desire to bring the
textual interpretation as close as is reasonable to its original meaning. Cf Va. Bankshares,
Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1110 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (supporting departure
from tort law doctrine in interpreting section 14(a) of the Exchange Act "because I think
the federal cause of action at issue here was never enacted by Congress,... and hence the
more narrow [the Court] make[s] it (within the bounds of rationality) the more faithful
[the Court is] to [its] task.") (citation omitted).
204. Cf Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) ("In our view, the rationale of
Hochfelder ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief
sought."). However, unlike Aaron, the issue here does not involve a statutory text that
"was thought to be so unambiguous as to suggest that 'further inquiry may be
unnecessary."' See id. at 690. Instead, the issue concerns potentially different treatments
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10(b)'s scope to permit aiding and abetting claims in enforcement
actions,"" but non-deference in the private action context could raise the
possibility of an unduly narrow interpretation in the enforcement
context.
However, private actions and enforcement actions are distinct, and not
just because the Reform Act permits actions against aiders and abettors
in enforcement actions.2 6  The elements of a private cause of action
under Rule 10b-5 need not be coterminous with the elements in the
enforcement context. 11 7 For example, courts have long recognized a
reliance requirement in private actions; courts have rejected this
requirement for SEC enforcement actions.2 ' Indeed, the SEC itself has
argued for different treatment of enforcement actions from private
litigation under Rule 10b-5."" Distinctions between enforcement actions
and private actions are more strongly pronounced in light of the Reform
Act's extension of SEC authority in aiding and abetting actions.21 1
In United States v. O'Hagan,'" the Court addressed the
misappropriation theory of insider trading in the criminal liability
context."' Confronted with language from Central Bank, which appeared
to limit Section 10(b) to cases in which purchasers or sellers of securities
relied on deceptive statements or omissions, the Court determined that
case law limiting standing to purchasers or sellers of securities was
confined to private actions.! 1
Private actions raised concerns of litigation abuse and proof problems,
and this had supported the purchaser/seller requirement in the Court's
for private and enforcement actions, in light of Chevron, where a statute is silent or
ambiguous.
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e), (f) & cmts. (2000).
206. See, e.g., SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing
statutory differences).
207. See Grundfest, supra note 36, at 999-1000.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 544 (3d Cir. 1998); Rana Research,
8 F.3d at 1363-64. Some courts also have concluded that no statute of limitations exists for
SEC enforcement actions. See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490-92 (9th Cir. 1993).
However, the issue is not settled. See generally SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp. 1117, 1120-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part and vacated in part, and remanded by 76 F.3d 458 (2d Cir.
1996).
209. See Grundfest, supra note 36, at 999-1000 (discussing SEC arguments that
"enforcement actions are significantly different from private damage actions") (quoting
Brief of the United States Securities & Exchange Commission at 2, S.E.C. v. Rind, 991
F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) (No. 91-55972)).
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e), (f) (2000).
211. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
212. Id. at 665.
213. See id. at 664.
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Blue Chip Stamps decision.2 14 That holding then led to the language
respecting purchasers and sellers in Central Bank.2 5  As the policy
concerns that prompted the purchaser/seller requirement were not
present in this context, the O'Hagan Court concluded that this rule was
16
confined to private actions. 6 O'Hagan thus treats private actions
differently, and implicitly interprets Section 10(b) differently, based on
the unique aspects of private litigation.
The distinctive aspect of the private action from a textualist
perspective is that the action is not contained in the text, and apparently
was not intended by Congress. This distinction between private and
enforcement actions is different in kind from the policy questions noted
in Blue Chip Stamps, but no less significant. The concern that an overly
broad reading of secondary liability would further exceed the intended
scope of Section 10(b) is a fundamental interpretive concern. A court
might defer to the SEC respecting enforcement actions, but not defer
respecting private actions.
In sum, the extent to which the SEC's interpretation of the scope of
conduct prohibited by Section 10(b) merits deference is dependent on
the type of action. In the context of private securities litigation, such
deference is not called for, even if it were appropriate in the enforcement
context. The distinct policy concerns raised by private actions, the fact
that Congress apparently did not intend private actions in the first place,
and the distinction between the scope of Section 10(b) and elements of
rule 10b-5 all suggest that an ambiguity in the meaning of primary
liability should be interpreted to limit the private action. Even if
deference (Chevron or Skidmore) would otherwise be appropriate in the
context of private actions, it should not prevail over concerns that the
private action not exceed the intended scope of Section 10(b).2 7
214. See id.
215. See id. Central Bank's discussion "concerned only private civil litigation under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, not criminal liability. Central Bank's reference to purchasers or
sellers of securities must be read in light of a longstanding limitation on private § 10(b)
suits." Id. (noting that the Court in Blue Chip Stamps "confined the § 10(b) private right of
action because of 'policy considerations,"' in particular "the abuse potential and proof
problems inherent in suits by investors who neither bought nor sold"). See also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737, 739-47 (1975).
216. See id. at 665 ("Criminal prosecutions do not present the dangers the Court
addressed in Blue Chip Stamps, so that decision is 'inapplicable' to indictments for
violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.").
217. This conclusion would apply, a fortiori, to Skidmore deference.
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3. A Proposed Canon for Interpreting Ambiguities in the Scope of
Section 10(b) Narrowly for Private Actions
The issues raised by judicial interpretation of the scope of Section
10(b) for private actions call for an interpretive canon. Various judicial
canons of construction seek to avoid interpreting statutory ambiguities in
ways that reach results that Congress would not intend.2"' Many of these
canons are longstanding features of statutory interpretation." '
Frequently, canons involve rules of syntax and grammar designed to
derive statutory meaning from the placement of words in the text."
Other canons, known as normative or substantive canons, involve policy
choices."'
For example, the absurdity doctrine assumes that Congress would not
have drafted a statute with absurd results; 222 the Charming Betsy canon
calls on courts to interpret ambiguous statutory language in a manner
consistent with international law.223 Similarly, courts decline to decide
constitutional questions arising out of a statutory ambiguity where they
may choose an interpretation that does not raise constitutional
224 225
concerns. There are many additional normative canons.
Canons are not without their critics. Courts implementing the
constitutional avoidance canon do not reach the constitutional issues
involved in the case, and in the process they run the risk of assigning a
218. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992).
219. See id. at 562.
220. Id. at 563. Ejusdem generis is a classic example of this type of canon.
221. For discussion of the distinctions between descriptive and normative or
substantive canons, see id. at 563. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 150-54 (1990).
222. The absurdity doctrine appears in Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank,
N.A. 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994). For an extended treatment of the canon, see Manning,
supra note 54, at 2388-92.
223. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (setting
forth the canon of that name). See also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J.
479, 482-91 (1998) (describing sources and application of Charming Betsy canon).
224. A recent decision which applied the constitutional avoidance canon is Solid Waste
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001). This canon actually
comes in two forms, one requiring courts to avoid an interpretation that raises
constitutional questions, applied in Solid Waste Agency, and the other requiring courts to
avoid an interpretation that is unconstitutional. Discussion of the latter can be found in
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991).
225. One notable group of normative canons are the various "clear statement" rules
which require a clear statement of congressional intent to overcome a judicial presumption
against a particular result. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 285 (1994) (describing clear statement rules); Bradley, supra note 223,
at 506 n.140 (citing cases involving clear statement rules).
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statutory meaning different from that intended by Congress.226 There are
persuasive arguments against the absurdity doctrine on the theory that
irrational results are unsurprising effects of legislative compromise.227 As
customary international law has expanded and evolved, the Charming
Betsy canon has also come under criticism. Canons generally have
come under attack. Opponents have long argued that judges may pick
and choose which canon to apply,"9 and moreover, congressional intent
often cannot be divined. 2 ' These conclusions undermine the use of
canons as a means to approach congressional intent.
Unlike the typical normative canon, however, interpretation of Section
10(b) operates against a background of a judicial expansion of the text. 3
This background suggests its own interpretive canon, which should trump
232Chevron deference, and should certainly trump policy concerns. Whenthere are two possible interpretations of the scope of conduct prohibited
226. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983). Judge Posner asserts:
Congress's practical ability to overrule a judicial decision misconstruing one of its
statutes, given all the other matters pressing for its attention, is less today than
ever before, and probably was never very great. The practical effect of
interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is therefore to
enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most
extravagant modern interpretation of the Constitution-to create a judge-made
constitutional 'penumbra' that has much the same prohibitory effect as the
judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself.
Id.
227. See Manning, supra note 54, at 2408-19 (discussing likelihood of awkward
statutory results from legislative compromise, and implications of interest group theory for
the absurdity doctrine). See also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 458-62 (2002)
(rejecting claim of absurdity based on the workings of the legislative process).
228. See Bradley, supra note 223, at 495-504 (critiquing intent-based and
internationalist theories supporting the canon).
229. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401
(1950) (claiming that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point."). But cf
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
26-27 (1997) (questioning Llewellyn's examples).
230. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the
Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 87-91 (1984).
231. See Grundfest, supra note 36, at 978-79.
232. Various canons have trumped Chevron deference. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 330 (2000) ("It is plain, however, that a
variety of canons of construction -what I am calling nondelegation canons-trump
Chevron itself."). Professor Sunstein provides as an example Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208-09, 212-13 (1988) (noting canon against interpreting
a statute as retroactive and denying deference to agency counsel's interpretations when
the agency articulated no position on the question). See also DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. of Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-78 (1988) (denying deference in
light of the canon of avoiding interpretation that raises constitutional questions).
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by Section 10(b) for purposes of a private action, courts should choose
the narrow interpretation. This interpretation deviates least from the
original text.
In general terms, the need for a narrow reading of unintended private
rights of action has already been noted by Justice Scalia in his
concurrence in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg.233 Also, Professor
Grundfest has argued that the text of Section 10(b) is akin to an inkblot,
as evidenced by the closely split decisions and often patternless vote
groupings of Supreme Court justices. He rightly asks whether the
Court should speculate over congressional intentions not contemplated
by Congress39  Grundfest therefore concludes that the statutory
interpretation should be narrow:
No doubt, strict textualism suffers from a host of serious flaws,
but so does every rule for interpreting a statute that presents
itself as an inkblot. In order to avoid these intractable
interpretive difficulties, the best the Court can do is adopt an
avowedly narrow interpretive approach which gives section
10(b) the minimally necessary scope required for its practical
existence as an implied private right of action. This result can
be achieved through a wide variety of analytic techniques, of
236which strict textualism is but one.
Although Grundfest's general approach is sensible, I would not groundthisapprach n . 237
this approach in pragmatism. Grundfest espouses narrow readings of
the statute for lack of any other interpretive guide to address the
vagueness of Section 10(b) . Instead, a narrow reading of the ambiguity
in the scope of Section 10(b) should be grounded solely in textual
concerns. Given a statutory provision that raises serious doubts whether
Congress intended to extend liability to unattributed participants in a
misrepresentation, viewed in the context of a cause of action not based
on text or legislative intent, any ambiguity should be read to restrict the
239
scope of the private action.
233. 501 U.S. 1083, 1110 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
234. See Grundfest, supra note 5, at 47-50, 52-55.
235. See id. at 60.
236. Id. at 61.
237. Cf. id. ("My argument for narrow construction of section 10(b) is thus pragmatic
at heart. Once the Court abandons a narrow construction of the statute, it is without any
objective guidance as to how far it should stretch in defining the scope of the implied
section 10(b) private remedy.").
238. See id. at 55-58, 60-61.
239. As noted, this result would have no impact in the enforcement context, where
Congress has extended the SEC's authority to aiding and abetting actions. See 15 U.S.C. §
78t(e) (2000).
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This approach would lessen the potential for expansion of the private
cause of action beyond the intended scope of Section 10(b), an expansion
recognized as unacceptable by the Supreme Court.24 '  As with the
constitutional avoidance canon, the theory is that Congress would have
intended the more limited reading of statutory language where the text
supports this reading. Unlike the constitutional avoidance canon, there
is little reason to doubt the narrow reading reflects congressional intent,
because Congress actually did not create the cause of action in the first
place.
This resolution of a scope ambiguity is different from the situation
presented in cases where the Court must fill gaps in the elements of the
private cause of action. In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner,42 for example, the Supreme Court concluded that the Section
10(b) private cause of action included an in pari delicto defense. 243 This
defense went unmentioned in Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, and the court
• 244
had to decide the contours of the defense without text to guide.. The
defendants in Bateman Eichler argued for a broad interpretation of the
defense based on the common law because Congress only impliedly
provided the private action.24' The Court, however, concluded that
policy concerns, including the important role implied private actions play
in enforcement, supported a more narrow version of the defense, which
would provide greater protection to plaintiffs than a rigid common law
246interpretation.
The Bateman Eichler Court's rejection of arguments for an expansive
defense to a private cause of action presumably seeks to construe the
Rule 10b-5 action so that it effectuates the goals of full disclosure and• 247
fraud prevention. However, in Central Bank, the Court noted that it
seeks to determine the elements of the Rule 10b-5 action in terms of
240. See Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A. 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994);
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976).
241. See, e.g., DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. of Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended
to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden
it.").
242. 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
243. Id. at 309-11.
244. See id. at 309 (discussing in pari delicto defense in context of an implied private
right of action).
245. See id.
246. See id. at 310.
247. See id. (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983), for
the proposition that the securities laws "were intended 'to rectify perceived deficiencies in
the available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the
securities industry"').
[Vol. 53:667
2004] Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors 705
what Congress would have enacted .2 This interpolation poses a distinct
question from whether the text of Section 10(b) prohibits particular
conduct. Cases like Bateman Eichler do not raise the risk of finding an
implied cause of action based upon conduct not prohibited by the text of
Section 10(b).
A possible objection is that the modern Court has shown a willingness
to locate additional implied causes of action under Section 10(b). In
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wasau,249 the Court
recognized a defendant's right of contribution.2 " However, Musick is
readily distinguishable. Justice Kennedy, who authored Central Bank,
was explicit in Musick that the conduct at issue was already prohibited
and actionable under the Court's precedent:
Even though we are being asked to recognize a cause of action
that supports a suit against these parties, the duty is but the duty
to contribute for having committed a wrong that courts have
already deemed actionable under federal law. The violation of
the securities laws gives rise to the 10b-5 private cause of action,
and the question before us is the ancillary one of how damages
are to be shared among persons or entities already subject to
that liability. Having implied the underlying liability in the first
place, to now disavow any authority to allocate it on the theory
that Congress has not addressed the issue would be most unfair
to those against whom damages are assessed.251
Although the majority reasoning in Musick is in tension with the idea
that new implied causes of action should not be found under Section
10(b),252 the reasoning is consistent with the concept that new implied
causes of action should not be recognized by expanding the scope of
conduct prohibited by Section 10(b).
The scope of prohibited conduct poses the real issue in Central Bank.
Assuming the scope question is unclear, whether the interpretive
question is one of Section 10(b) scope, or one of Rule 10b-5 elements, is
debatable. Recognizing that the scope of prohibited conduct should be
interpreted narrowly in the context of a private action resolves this
uncertainty. If a court construes Section 10(b) to require the "bright
line" test, then the scope of Section 10(b) precludes a participation
theory, even if participation would otherwise satisfy the common law
elements of fraud.
248. See Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994).
249. See Musick, Peeler, & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
250. See id. at 298.
251. Id. at 292.
252. See id. at 298, 300 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority improperly
recognized an implied cause of action).
Catholic University Law Review
It is questionable whether Central Bank is directly on point where the
statute is found to be ambiguous. The Central Bank Court interpreted
congressional silence respecting secondary liability as decisive."' But
Central Bank is relevant to resolving the statutory interpretation
problem. The question of Section 10(b) scope comes prior to that of
Rule 10b-5 gap-filling-it is whether to interpolate a cause of action in
the first place. If, as in Central Bank, it is improper to expand the private
action to include secondary liability when Congress was silent, it is
similarly improper to expansively interpret the private action to include
participants in the creation of someone else's misrepresentation, absent a
clear statement in Section 10(b) to that effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
The absence of statutory text explicitly excluding a participation
theory should not encourage the taking of judicial liberties: "Congress'
failure to act does not justify further judicial elaboration of the 10b-5
action., 214 And, given recent legislative history, it is hard to say that
Congress acquiesced in private actions against secondary actors based on
their participation in creating a misrepresentation.25 5 Congress showed
its ability to reverse Central Bank when it amended the Securities
Exchange Act to permit the SEC to bring enforcement actions against
aiders and abettors. Its failure to do the same for private litigation is
noteworthy, and courts should pause before construing Section 10(b) to
include secondary actors that participate in fraud without independently
committing fraud.257
The securities fraud committed by issuers in the late 1990's was
undeterred by either the threat of SEC enforcement or of private
litigation, and it is conjecture what effect a different holding in Central
Bank would have had on secondary actors. The ultimate fallout of the
subsequent bankruptcies and lawsuits is also unclear, and the ensuing
253. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176-77.
254. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. 508 U.S. 286, 304 (1993)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
255. See supra notes 6-12, 57-60, and accompanying text.
256. See 15 U.S.C. 78t(e), (f) (2000).
257. Professor Fisch interprets this post-Central Bank development to support an
expansive view of secondary liability. Fisch, supra note 54, at 1318. Although, if anything,
the congressional choice not to create more expansive private actions supports a narrow
reading of the statute, the text means whatever it originally meant respecting private
actions, irrespective of Congress's decision to leave that text intact. Were it otherwise, the
many instances of congressional silence would invite a constant threat of judicial
legislation.
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policy debate will no doubt occupy substantial commentary. 2 , The
textual debate over Section 10(b), however, is also quite contentious and
raises questions independent of policy.
259
This article concludes that Section 10(b) precludes a participation
theory. In light of the text of Section 10(b), the participation theories
should generally be rejected, as secondary actors that participate in the
creation of a misrepresentation do not typically "use" or "employ" a
deceptive device or contrivance. But, if a court nonetheless found the
text ambiguous, this ought not to be an invitation to defer to the SEC's
broad reading, whatever format the SEC interpretation might take.
The Supreme Court will likely have to resolve the circuit split
regarding primary liability for secondary actors in private litigation.
Should the Court do so, it will face the same concerns respecting
secondary liability as it did in Central Bank. The possibility of a de facto
aiding and abetting action recast in terms of "participation" is quite real.
Judicial restraint counsels a restrictive reading of statutory ambiguity in
this context. A narrow interpretation of the scope of conduct prohibited
by Section 10(b) for private actions most closely follows the original text
of Section 10(b), unadorned by judicial elaboration.
258. See, e.g., Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: Will it Be
Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28 J. CORP. L. 69, 74
(2002) (arguing for a legislative override of Central Bank).
259. Cf. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177.
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